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Abstract
The growing popularity and adoption of differential privacy in
academic and industrial settings has resulted in the development
of increasingly sophisticated algorithms for releasing information
while preserving privacy. Accompanying this phenomenon is the
natural rise in the development and publication of incorrect al-
gorithms, thus demonstrating the necessity of formal verification
tools. However, existing formal methods for differential privacy
face a dilemma: methods based on customized logics can verify
sophisticated algorithms but come with a steep learning curve and
significant annotation burden on the programmers, while existing
programming platforms lack expressive power for some sophisti-
cated algorithms.
In this paper, we present LightDP, a simple imperative language
that strikes a better balance between expressive power and usability.
The core of LightDP is a novel relational type system that separates
relational reasoning from privacy budget calculations. With depen-
dent types, the type system is powerful enough to verify sophis-
ticated algorithms where the composition theorem falls short. In
addition, the inference engine of LightDP infers most of the proof
details, and even searches for the proof with minimal privacy cost
bound when multiple proofs exist. We show that LightDP verifies
sophisticated algorithms with little manual effort.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.3.1 [Programming Lan-
guages]: Formal Definitions and Theory; D.2.4 [Software En-
gineering]: Software/Program Verification; F.3.1 [Logics and
Meanings of Programs]: Specifying and Verifying and Reasoning
about Programs.
Keywords Differential privacy; dependent types; type inference;
1. Introduction
Companies, government agencies, and academics are interested in
analyzing and modeling datasets containing sensitive information
about individuals (e.g., medical records, customer behavior, etc.).
Privacy concerns can often be mitigated if the algorithms used to
manipulate the data, answer queries, and build statistical models
satisfy differential privacy (Dwork et al. 2006b) — a set of restric-
tions on their probabilistic behavior that provably limit the ability
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of attackers to infer individual-level sensitive information (Dwork
et al. 2006b; Kifer and Machanavajjhala 2014).
Since 2006, differential privacy has seen explosive growth in
many areas, including theoretical computer science, databases, ma-
chine learning, and statistics. This technology has been deployed in
practice, starting with the U.S. Census Bureau LEHD OnTheMap
tool (Machanavajjhala et al. 2008), the Google Chrome Browser
(Erlingsson et al. 2014), and Apple’s new data collection efforts
(Greenberg 2016). However, the increase in popularity and usage
of differential privacy has also been accompanied by a correspond-
ing increase in the development and implementation of algorithms
with flawed proofs of privacy; for example, Chen and Machanava-
jjhala (2015) and Lyu et al. (2016) catalog some recent cases about
variations of the Sparse Vector method (Dwork and Roth 2014) .
Currently, there are two strategies for combating this trend. The
first is the use of programming platforms (McSherry 2009; Mohan
et al. 2012; Roy et al. 2010) that have privacy primitives that restrict
the privacy-preserving algorithms that can be implemented and of-
ten add more noise than is necessary to the computation. The sec-
ond strategy is the development of languages and formal verifica-
tion tools for differential privacy (Reed and Pierce 2010; Gaboardi
et al. 2013; Barthe et al. 2012, 2014, 2016c,b). These languages en-
able the development of much more sophisticated algorithms that
use less noise and hence provide more accurate outputs. However,
the increased power of the formal methods comes with a consider-
able cost — a programmer has to heavily annotate code and gener-
ate proofs using complicated logics such as a customized relational
Hoare logic proposed by Barthe et al. (2012). Moreover, intricate
proof details have to be provided by a programmer, which makes
exploring variations of an algorithm difficult since small variations
in code can cause significant changes to a proof.
In this paper, we present LightDP, a language for developing
provably privacy-preserving algorithms. The goal of LightDP is to
minimize the burden on the programmer while retaining most of
the capabilities of the state-of-the-art, such as verifying the Sparse
Vector method (Dwork and Roth 2014) (an algorithm which, until
very recently (Barthe et al. 2016c,b), was beyond the capabilities
of verification tools). For example, we show that the Sparse Vector
method can be verified in LightDP with little manual effort: just
two lines of annotation from the programmer.
LightDP is equipped with a novel light-weight relational type
system that clearly separates relational reasoning from privacy bud-
get calculation. In particular, it transforms the original probabilis-
tic program into an equivalent nonprobabilistic program, where all
privacy costs become explicit. With dependent types, the explic-
itly calculated privacy cost in the target language may depend on
program states, hence enabling the verification of sophisticated al-
gorithms (e.g., the Sparse Vector method) that are beyond the capa-
bility of many existing methods (Reed and Pierce 2010; Gaboardi
et al. 2013; Barthe et al. 2012, 2014) based on the composition the-
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orem (McSherry 2009). Moreover, the transformed nonprobabilis-
tic program is ready for off-the-shelf formal verification methods,
such as Hoare logic, to provide an upper bound of the privacy cost.
On the usability end, LightDP has an inference engine that re-
duces the already low annotation burden on the programmers. Al-
though the inference engine does not yet automate the privacy bud-
get calculation part of a proof, it does fill in missing details in the re-
lational reasoning part of a proof; furthermore, based on MaxSMT
theory, it even searches for the optimal proof that minimizes privacy
cost with minimal human involvement. For example, with only one
postcondition annotation and one loop invariant annotation from a
programmer, LightDP confirms that the proof in (Dwork and Roth
2014) indeed provides the minimal privacy cost.
To summarize, this paper makes the following contributions:
1. LightDP, a new imperative language for verifying sophisticated
privacy-preserving algorithms (Section 3.1),
2. expressive static annotations incorporating dependent types, en-
abling precise tracking of privacy costs (Section 3.3),
3. a formal proof that the LightDP type system soundly tracks
differential privacy costs, and new proof techniques involved
in the soundness proof (Section 4),
4. an inference engine that automatically fills in missing details
involved in the relational reasoning part of a proof, and further,
minimizes provable privacy cost bound when multiple proofs
exist, with little manual effort (Section 5),
5. case studies on complex algorithms showing that formal veri-
fication of privacy-preserving algorithms are viable with little
programmer annotation burden (Section 6).
2. Preliminaries and Illustrating Example
2.1 Distributions
We define the set of sub-distributions over a discrete set A, writ-
ten Dist(A), as the set of functions µ : A → [0, 1], such that∑
a∈A µ a ≤ 1. When applied to an event E ⊆ A, we define
µ(E) ,
∑
e∈E µ(e). Notice that we do not require
∑
a∈A µ a =
1, a special case when µ is a distribution, since sub-distribution
gives rise to an elegant semantics for programs that may not termi-
nate (Kozen 1981).
Given a distribution µ ∈ Dist(A), its support is defined as
support(µ) , {a | µ(a) > 0}. We use 1a to represent the
degenerate distribution µ that µ(a) = 1 and µ(a′) = 0 if a′ 6= a.
Moreover, sub-distributions can be given a structure of a monad.
Formally, we define the unit and bind functions as follows:
unit : A→ Dist(A) , λa. 1a
bind : Dist(A)→ (A→ Dist(B))→ Dist(B)
, λµ. λf. (λb.
∑
a∈A
(f a b)× µ(a))
That is, unit takes an element in A and returns the Dirac distribu-
tion where all mass is assigned to a; bind takes µ, a distribution
on A, and f , a mapping from A to distributions on B (e.g., a con-
ditional distribution of B given A), and returns the corresponding
marginal distribution on B. This monadic view will avoid cluttered
definitions and proofs when probabilistic programs are involved
(Section 3.2).
2.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy has two major variants: pure (Dwork et al.
2006b) (obtained by setting δ = 0 in the following definition) and
approximate (Dwork et al. 2006a) (obtained by choosing a δ > 0).
function SPARSEVECTOR (T,N,  : num0 ; q : list num∗ )
returns (out : list bool0 )
precondition ∀i. −1 ≤ (q̂[i]) ≤ 1
c1, c2, i : num0; T˜ , η1 : num1; η2 : numq[i]+η2≥T˜?2:0
1 η1 := Lap (2/);
2 T˜ := T + η1;
3 c1 := 0; c2 := 0; i := 0;
4 while (c1 < N)
5 η2 := Lap (4N/);
6 if (q[i] + η2 ≥ T˜) then
7 out:= true::out;
8 c1 := c1 + 1;
9 else
10 out:= false::out;
11 c2 := c2 + 1;
12 i := i+1;
Figure 1. The Sparse Vector method. Type annotations are shown
in grey. The precondition specifies the adjacency assumption.
Definition 1 (Differential privacy). Let , δ ≥ 0. A probabilistic
computation M : A → Dist(B) is (, δ)-differentially private
with respect to an adjacency relation Ψ ⊆ A× A if for every pair
of inputs a1, a2 ∈ A such that a1Ψa2, and every output subset
E ⊆ B, we have
P (Ma1 ∈ E) ≤ exp()P (Ma2 ∈ E) + δ
Intuitively, a probabilistic computation satisfies differential pri-
vacy if it produces similar distributions for any pair of inputs related
by Ψ. In the most common applications of differential privacy,A is
the set of possible databases and the adjacency relation Ψ is chosen
so that a1Ψa2 whenever a1 can be obtained from a2 by adding or
removing data belonging to a single individual.
In this paper, we focus on the verification of algorithms that sat-
isfy pure differential privacy. An algorithm is -differentially pri-
vate iff it is (, 0)-differentially private according to Definition 1.
2.3 The Sparse Vector Method
The goal of formal methods for verifying -differential privacy is
to provide an upper bound on the privacy cost  of a program.
Typically, users will have a fixed privacy budget ′ and can only
run programs whose provable privacy cost  does not exceed the
budget:  ≤ ′. For this reason, it is important that formal methods
are able to prove a tight upper bound on the privacy cost.
With the exception of (Barthe et al. 2016c,b), most existing for-
mal methods rely on the composition theorem (McSherry 2009).
That is, in the case of -differential privacy, those methods essen-
tially treat a program as a series of modules, each with a provable
upper bound i on its privacy cost. Then by the composition theo-
rem (McSherry 2009), the total privacy cost is bounded by
∑
i i.
However, for sophisticated advanced algorithms, the composition
theorem often falls short — it can provide upper bounds that are
arbitrarily larger than the true privacy cost. Providing the tightest
privacy cost for intricate algorithms requires formal methods that
are more powerful but avoid over-burdening the programmers with
annotation requirements. To illustrate these challenges, we con-
sider the Sparse Vector method (Dwork and Roth 2014). It is a
prime example of the need for formal methods because many of
its published variants have been shown to be incorrect (Chen and
Machanavajjhala 2015; Lyu et al. 2016).
The Sparse Vector method also has many correct variants, one
of which is shown in Figure 1. For now, safely ignore the type an-
notations in grey and the precondition. Here, the input list q repre-
sents a sequence of results of counting queries q1, q2, q3, . . . (e.g.,
how many patients in the data have cancer, how many patients con-
tracted an infection in the hospital, etc.) running on a database. The
goal is to answer as accurately as possible the following question:
which queries, when evaluated on the true database, return an an-
swer greater than the threshold T (a program input unrelated to the
sensitive data)?
To achieve differential privacy, the algorithm adds appropriate
Laplace noise to the threshold and to each query. Here, Lap (4N/)
draws one sample from the Laplace distribution with mean zero
and a scale factor (4N/). If the noisy query answer (q[i] + η2)
is above the noisy threshold T˜ , it adds true to the output list out
(in the slot reserved for that query) and otherwise, it adds false.
The key to this algorithm is the deep observation that once noise
has been added to the threshold, queries for which we output true
have a privacy cost (so we can answer at most N of them, where
N is a parameter); however, outputting false for a query does
not introduce any new privacy costs (Dwork and Roth 2014). The
algorithm ensures that the total privacy cost is bounded by the input
, the parameter used in Figure 1. This remarkable property makes
the Sparse Vector method ideal in situations where the vast majority
of query counts are expected to be below the threshold.
Failure of the composition theorem If we just use the composi-
tion theorem, we would have a privacy cost of /4N for each loop
iteration (i.e., every time Lap (4N/) noise is added to a query
answer) due to the property of the Laplace distribution. Since the
number of iterations are not a priori bounded, the composition the-
orem could not prove that the algorithm satisfies ′-differential pri-
vacy for any finite ′; more advanced methods are needed.
Informal proof and sample runthrough Proofs of correctness
(of this and other variants) can be found in (Dwork and Roth
2014; Chen and Machanavajjhala 2015; Lyu et al. 2016). Here we
provide an informal correctness argument by example to illustrate
the subtleties involved both in proving it and inferring a tight bound
for the algorithm.
Suppose we set the parameters T = 4 (we want to know which
queries have a value at least 4) and N = 1 (we stop the algorithm
after the first time it outputs true). Consider the following two
databasesD1, D2 that differ on one record, and their corresponding
query answers:
D1 : q[0] = 2, q[1] = 3, q[2] = 5
D2 : q[0] = 3, q[1] = 3, q[2] = 4
Suppose in one execution on D1, the noise added to T is α(1) = 1
and the noise added to q[0], q[1], q[2] is β(1)0 = 2, β
(1)
1 = 0, β
(1)
2 =
0, respectively. Thus the noisy threshold is T˜ = 5 and the noisy
query answers are q[0]+β(1)0 = 4, q[1]+β
(1)
1 = 3, q[2]+β
(1)
2 = 5
and so the algorithm outputs the sequence: (false, false, true).
According to Definition 1, for any output sequence ω, we
need to show P (M(D1) = ω) ≤ eP (M(D2) = ω) for
all possible outputs ω and databases D1, D2 that differ on one
record. For the databases D1, D2 described above, we will show
that P (M(D1) = (false, false, true)) ≤ eP (M(D2) =
(false, false, true)). We proceed in two steps.
Aligning randomness We first create an injective (but not neces-
sarily bijective) function from the randomness in the execution un-
derD1 into the randomness in the execution underD2, so that both
executions generate the same output. For an execution underD2, let
α(2) be the noise added to the threshold and let β(2)0 , β
(2)
1 , β
(2)
2 be
the noise added to the queries q[0], q[1], q[2], respectively. Consider
an injective function candidate that adds 1 to the threshold noise
(i.e., α(2) = α(1) + 1), keeps the noise of queries for which D1 re-
ported false (i.e., β(2)0 = β
(1)
0 and β
(2)
1 = β
(1)
1 ) and adds 2 to the
noise of queries for whichD1 reported true (i.e., β
(2)
2 = β
(1)
2 +2).
In our running example, execution under D2 with this function
would result in the noisy threshold T˜ = 6 and noise query answers
q[0] + β
(2)
0 = 5, q[1] + β
(2)
1 = 3, q[2] + β
(2)
2 = 6. Hence, the
output once again is (false, false, true). In fact, it is easy to see
that under this injective function, every execution under D1 would
result in an execution under D2 that produces the same answer.
Counting privacy cost For each output ω, let f be the injective
function; let A be the set of random variable assignments that
cause execution under D1 to produce ω; let B be the possible
assignments we can get by applying f to A; and let C be the
set of random variable assignments that are not in the range of f ,
but nevertheless cause execution under D2 to produce the output
ω as well1. Then we can rewrite P (M(D1) = ω) = P (A) and
P (M(D2) = ω) = P (B) + P (C).
Once we have done the alignment of randomness as above, and
recalling thatN = 1 in our example, the proof finishes by showing:
P (A) =
∑
a∈A
P (a) ≤ e 2 e2 4N
∑
a∈A
P (f(a))
= eP (B) ≤ e(P (B) + P (C))
where the e

2 factor results from using a threshold value that is 1
larger, while the e2

4N factor results from adding 2 to the noise for
query q[2]. Notice that no privacy cost is paid for queries q[0] and
q[1], since the same noise is added under D1 and D2. Moreover,
due to the injective assumption,
∑
a∈A P (f(a)) = P (B).
Challenges The Sparse Vector method is a prime example of the
need for formal methods, since paper-and-pencil proof is shown
to be error-prone for its variants. The intricacy in its proof brings
major challenges for formal methods:
1. Precision: a crucial observation in the proof is that once noise
has been added to the threshold, different privacy costs are only
paid for outputting true. Hence, the cost calculation needs to
consider program states.
2. Aligning randomness: finding an injective function from the
randomness under D1 to that under D2 such that outputting ω
under D1 entails outputting ω under D2 is the most intriguing
piece in the proof. However, coming up with a correct function,
as we described informally above, is non-trivial.
3. Finding the tightest bound: in fact, an infinite number of proofs
exist for the Sparse Vector method, though with various prov-
able privacy costs2. Since a tighter privacy cost bound allows a
privacy-preserving algorithm to produce more accurate outputs,
a formal method should produce the tightest one when possible.
Except the very recent work by Barthe et al. (2016c,b), existing
formal methods (e.g., (Reed and Pierce 2010; Gaboardi et al. 2013;
Barthe et al. 2012, 2014)) rely on the composition theorem, hence
fail to prove that the Sparse Vector method satisfies ′-privacy for
any ′. Recent work by Barthe et al. (2016c,b) verifies variants of
the Sparse Vector method, but its customized relational logic in-
curs heavy annotation burden, including the randomness alignment.
Moreover, those work cannot search for the tightest cost bound.
1 This is possible since we do not assume the function to be a bijection.
2 For example, another injective function adds 2 to the threshold noise (i.e.,
α(2) = α(1)+2), keeps the noise of queries for whichD1 reported false
(i.e., β(2)0 = β
(1)
0 and β
(2)
1 = β
(1)
1 ) and adds 3 to the noise of queries for
which D1 reported true (i.e., β
(2)
2 = β
(1)
2 + 3). It is easy to check that
this mapping has the desired property, but the privacy cost is (7)/4.
2.4 Our Approach
To tackle the challenges above, we propose LightDP, an imperative
language that enables verification and even inference of the tightest
privacy cost for sophisticated privacy-preserving algorithms. We
illustrate the key components of LightDP in this section, and detail
all components in the rest of this paper.
Relational reasoning The core of LightDP is a novel light-weight
dependent type system that explicitly captures the exact differ-
ence of a variable’s values in two executions under two adjacent
databases. Let v(1) (v(2)) be the value of a variable x in an exe-
cution under D1 (D2). The type τ for x in LightDP has the form
of Bd, meaning that x holds a value of basic type B (e.g., int,
real, bool), and v(1) + d = v(2). Required type annotations for
the Sparse Vector method are shown in grey in Figure 1. Note that
for brevity, we write num for numeric base types (e.g., int, real).
Hereafter, we refer to the d counterpart as the distance.
In the simplest case, the distance is a constant. For example, the
input threshold T has a type num0, meaning that its value remains
the same in two executions (since T is a parameter unrelated to
private information about individuals). The distance of variable η1
captures one randomness alignment in the informal proof above:
we enforce a distance of 1 for η1 (i.e., we map noise v to v + 1 for
any value v sampled in the execution under D1).
The distance may also depend on program states. Hence,
LightDP supports dependent types. For instance, consider the dis-
tance of η2: q[i] + η2 ≥ T˜?2 : 0. This annotation specifies an
injective function that maps noise v to v + 2 when the value of
q[i] + η2 ≥ T˜ is true (i.e., the output is true) in an execution
under D1, and maps noise v to v otherwise. As we will see shortly,
dependent types allow a precise privacy cost to be calculated under
various program states, hence enabling bounding privacy cost in a
tighter way than mechanisms based on the composition theorem.
Moreover, LightDP uses a distinguished distance ∗ as a short-
hand for the standard Sigma type (e.g., num∗ , Σx:num0 numx). In
other words, each value of type num∗ (e.g., each query in the list q)
can be interpreted as a pair of the form (x : num0, y : numx), where
the first component specifies the distance of the second component.
Note that by language design, the first component is invisible in the
privacy-preserving algorithm; however, the type system may rea-
son about and manipulate it via a distinguished operation̂ . For
instance, the precondition in the running example states the adja-
cent assumption on databases: for each query answer q[i] in q, its
distance (q̂[i]) is bounded by±1. The star type is also useful for dis-
tances that cannot be easily captured at compile time (Section 3.1).
With type annotations, a type system statically verifies that the
distances are maintained as an invariant throughout the execution.
For example, the output out in Figure 1 has type list bool0,
meaning that each element in the list has type bool0. Hence, the
invariant maintained by the type system ensures that two related
executions always generate the same output.
Calculating privacy cost When type-checking succeeds, the type
system transforms the original program to a non-probabilistic, non-
relational program where privacy cost is explicitly calculated. The
transformed program for the Sparse Vector method is shown in
Figure 2.
The transformed program is almost identical to the original
one, except that: 1) the privacy cost is explicitly calculated via a
new variable v, and 2) probabilistic instructions are replaced by a
new nondeterministic instruction havoc η, which semantically sets
variable η to an arbitrary value upon execution.
The fundamental soundness theorem of the type system states
that, informally, if 1) the original program type-checks, and 2) v
is always bounded by some constant ′ in the transformed program,
then the original program being verified is ′-differentially private.
function TSPARSEVEC (T,N,  : num; q : list num; q̂ : list num)
returns (out : list bool)
precondition ∀i. −1 ≤ (q̂[i]) ≤ 1
1 v := 0;
2 havoc η1;v := v + /2;
3 T˜ := T + η1;
4 c1 := 0; c2 := 0; i := 0;
5 while (c1 < N)
Invariant : c1 ≤ N ∧ v = /2 + c1× 2N
6 havoc η2;v := v + (q[i] + η2 ≥ T˜?2 : 0)× /4N ;
7 if (q[i] + η2 ≥ T˜) then
8 out:= true::out;
9 c1 := c1+1;
10 else
11 out:= false::out;
12 c2 := c2+1;
13 i := i+1;
Figure 2. The transformed program. The instrumented statements
are underlined. The loop invariant to prove the postcondition v ≤
 is shown in grey.
Notice that for the second property (the problem of bounding
v), any off-the-shelf verification tool for functional correctness
can be utilized. For instance, the program above with the desired
postcondition v ≤  can be verified by Hoare logic, with one loop
invariant provided by a programmer (the grey box in Figure 2).
2.5 Type Inference
The mechanisms sketched so far provide a light-weight yet power-
ful formal method for differential privacy. The annotation burden
is much reduced compared with (Barthe et al. 2016c). However,
providing the correct and optimal type annotations (especially for
random variables η1 and η2) is still subtle for a programmer.
Although it is folklore that type inference in face of dependent
types can be daunting, LightDP is equipped with an inference en-
gine that, at least for many algorithms, not only infers correct an-
notations, but also enables finding annotations that minimize pri-
vacy cost when multiple annotations exist. For example, given the
function signature in Figure 1, the inference algorithm in Section 5
automatically infers types for all variables. The inferred types are
identical to the ones in Figure 1 except that T˜ , η1 are assigned
with a distance α and η2 is assigned with a distance expression
q[i]+η2 ≥ T˜?β : γ, where α, β, γ are variables to be inferred, sub-
ject to constraints generated during type checking. For the Sparse
Vector method, multiple correct type annotations exist. For exam-
ple,α = 1, β = 2, γ = 0 corresponds to the annotation in Figure 1.
Moreover, α = 0, β = 2, γ = −2 and α = 2, β = 3, γ = 0 are
both correct annotations.
Given type annotations with distance variables, the type-guided
transformation as sketched above generates target program where
variables to be inferred (i.e., α, β, γ) are used in the calculation of
privacy cost. The difference is that v increments by (α)/2 at line
2 and increments by (q[i] + η2 ≥ T˜?β : γ) × /4N at line 6 in
Figure 2. By Hoare logic, we can easily bound the privacy cost to
be α/2 + β/4 + c2× γ/4N .
Putting it all together, finding the optimal proof is equivalent
to a MaxSMT problem: min (2α+ β + c2× γ/N), given that
constraints generated in type checking are satisfiable. Using an
existing MaxSMT solver, µZ (Bjørner and Phan 2014; Bjørner
et al. 2015), the optimal proof for the Sparse Vector method is
successfully inferred: α = 1, β = 2, γ = 0. This is exactly the
randomness alignment used in its proof (Dwork and Roth 2014).
Reals r ∈ R
Booleans b ∈ {true, false}
Vars x ∈ Var
Rand Vars η ∈ H
Linear Ops ⊕ ::= + | −
Other Ops ⊗ ::= × | /
Comparators  ::= <|>|=|≤|≥
Rand Exps g ::= Lap r
Expressions e ::= r | b | x | η | e1 ⊕ e2 | e1 ⊗ e2 | e1  e2 |
¬e | e1 :: e2 | e1[e2] | e1?e2 : e3
Commands c ::= skip | x := e | η := g | c1; c2 | return e |
if e then c1 else c2 | while e do c
Distances d ::= r | x | η | d1 ⊕ d2 | d1 ⊗ d2 | d1  d2?d3 : d4
Types τ ::= numd | num∗ | bool | list τ | τ1 → τ2
Figure 3. LightDP0: language syntax.
3. LightDP: A Language for Algorithm Design
We first introduce a simple imperative language, LightDP0, for de-
signing and verifying privacy-preserving algorithms. This language
is equipped with a dependent type system that enables formal veri-
fication of sophisticated algorithms where the composition theorem
falls short. In this section, we assume all type annotations are pro-
vided by a programmer. We will remove this restriction and enable
type inference in Section 5.
3.1 Syntax
The language syntax is given in Figure 3. LightDP0 is mostly a
standard imperative language except for the following features.
Random expressions Probabilistic reasoning is essential in privacy-
preserving algorithms. We use g to represent a random expression.
Since LightDP0 follows a modular design where new randomness
expression can be added easily, we only consider the most inter-
esting random expression, Lap r, for now. Semantically, Lap r
draws one sample from the Laplace distribution, with mean zero
and a scale factor r. We will discuss other random expressions in
Section 6.3.
Each random expression g can be assigned to a random vari-
able η, written as η := g. We distinguish random variables (H)
from normal variables (Var) for technical reasons explained in Sec-
tion 3.3. Notice that although the syntax restricts the distribution
scale parameters to be a constant, its mean can be an arbitrary ex-
pression e, via the legit expression e+ η, where η is sampled from
a distribution with mean zero.
List operations Sophisticated algorithms usually make multiple
queries to a database and produce multiple outputs during that
process. Rather than reasoning about the privacy cost associated
with each query in isolation and total the privacy costs using the
composition theorem, LightDP0 enables more precise reasoning
via built-in list type operations: e1 :: e2 appends the element e1 to a
list e2; e1[e2] gets the e2-th element in list e1, assuming e2 is bound
by the length of e1. We also assume a list variable is initialized to
an empty list.
Types with distances Each type τ has the form of Bd. Here, B
is a base type, such as num (numeric type), bool (Boolean), or an
application of a type constructor (e.g., list) to another type, or a
function (τ1 → τ2). d is a numeric expression that (semantically)
specifies the exact distance of the values stored in a variable in
two related executions. In particular, a distance expression is a
numeric expression in the language, as specified in Figure 3, where
d1  d2?d3 : d4 evaluates to d3 when the comparison evaluates to
true, and d4 otherwise.
function PARTIALSUM (, b, size : num0; q : list num∗)
returns (out : num0)
precondition ∀i ≥ 0. q̂[i] ≤ b∧
∀i ≥ 0. q̂[i] > 0⇒ (∀j > i. q̂[j] = 0)
1 sum : num∗; i : num0; η : num−ŝum
2 sum := 0; i := 0;
3 while (i < size)
4 sum := sum+q[i];
5 i := i+1;
6 η = Lap b/;
7 out := sum + η;
Figure 4. An -differentially private algorithm for summing over
a query list.
Since non-numeric types bool, list τ and τ1 → τ2 cannot be
associated with any numeric distance, those types are syntactic sug-
ars for bool0, (list τ)0 and (τ1 → τ2)0 respectively. Notice that
elements in a list of type (list τ)0 (e.g., parameter q in Figure 1)
may still have different elements in two related executions, since
the difference of elements is specified by type τ . The subscript 0
here simply restricts the list size in two related executions.
Star type LightDP0 also supports sum types, written as B∗, a
syntactic sugar of a Sigma type. More specifically, a variable x
with type num∗ is desugared as x : Σ(x̂:num0) numx̂, where x̂ is
a distinguished variable invisible in the source code, but can be
reasoned about and manipulated by the type system. Hiding the
first component of a Sigma type simplifies verification (Section 4).
The parameter q in Figure 1 is one example where the star type
is useful. Moreover, the star type enables reasoning about depen-
dencies that cannot be captured otherwise by a distance expression.
Consider the -differentially private Partial Sum algorithm in Fig-
ure 4. It implements an immediate solution to answering the sum
of a query list in a privacy preserving manner3: it aggregates the
accurate partial sum in a loop, and releases a noisy sum using the
Laplace mechanism. The precondition specifies the adjacency as-
sumption: at most one query answer may differ by at most b.
In this algorithm, the distance of variable sum changes in each it-
eration. Hence, the accurate type for sum is num∑i
j=0 q̂[j]
. However,
with the goal of keeping type system as light-weight as possible,
we assign sum to a star type. The type system will reason about and
manipulate distance component ŝum in a sound way (Section 3.3).
3.2 Semantics
The denotational semantics of the probabilistic language is defined
as a mapping from initial memory to a distribution on (possible)
final outputs. Formally, letM be a set of memory states where each
memory statem ∈M is an assignment of all (normal and random)
variables (Var ∪ H) to values. First, an expression e of base type B
is interpreted as a function JeK : m → JBK, where JBK represents
the set of values belonging to the base type B. We omit expression
semantics since it is mostly standard4.
A random expression g is interpreted as a distribution on real
values. Hence, JgK : Dist(JnumK). Moreover, a command c is in-
terpreted as a function JcK : M → Dist(M). For brevity, we
write JeKm and JcKm instead of JeK(m) and JcK(m) hereafter. Fig-
ure 5 provides the semantics of commands, where functions unit
3 We use this trivial algorithm here for its simplicity. We will analyze a more
sophisticated version in Section 6.
4 The reals in LightDP only come from sampling (or, the havoc command,
which mimics sampling). We assume the sample space is either finite or
countable.
JskipKm = unitmJx := eKm = unit (m{JeKm/x})Jη := gKm = bind JgK (λv. unitm{v/η})Jc1; c2Km = bind (Jc1Km) Jc2K
Jif e then c1 else c2Km = {Jc1Km if JeKm = trueJc2Km if JeKm = falseJwhile e do cKm = w∗ m
where w∗ = fix(λf. λm.if JeKm = true
then (bind JcKm f) else (unitm))Jc; return eKm = bind (JcKm) (λm′. unit JeKm′)
Figure 5. LightDP0: language semantics.
and bind are defined in Section 2.1. This semantics corresponds
directly to a semantics given by Kozen (1981), which interprets
programs as continuous linear operators on measures.
Finally, we assume all programs have the form (c; return e)
where c does not contain return statements. A LightDP0 program
is interpreted as a function m → DistJBK, defined in Figure 5,
where B is the type of expression returned (e).
3.3 Typing Rules and Target Language
We assume a typing environment Γ that tracks the type of each
variable (including random variable). For now, we assume a type
annotation is provided for each variable (i.e., dom(Γ) = Var ∪ H),
but we will remove this restriction in Section 5. The typing rules
are formalized in Figure 6. Since all typing rules share a global
invariant Ψ (e.g., the precondition in Figure 1), typing rules do not
propagate Ψ for brevity. We also write Γ(x) = d for ∃B. Γ(x) =
Bd when the context is clear.
Expressions For expressions, each rule has the form of Γ ` e : τ ,
meaning that the expression e has type τ under the environment Γ.
Rule (T-OPLUS) precisely tracks the distance of linear operations
(e.g., + and −), while rule (T-OTIMES) makes a conservative as-
sumption that other numerical operations take identical parameters.
It is completely possible to refine rule (T-OTIMES)) (e.g., by fol-
lowing the sensitivity analysis proposed by Reed and Pierce (2010);
Gaboardi et al. (2013)) to improve precision, however, we leave that
as future work since it is largely orthogonal.
Rule (T-VARSTAR) applies when variable x has a star type.
This rule unpacks the corresponding pair with Sigma type and
makes x̂ explicit in the type system.
The most interesting and novel rule is (T-ODOT). It type-checks
a comparison of two real expressions by generating a constraint:
Ψ⇒ (e1  e2 ⇔ (e1+d1) (e2+d2))
Intuitively, this constraint requires that in two related execu-
tions, the Boolean value of e1  e2 must be identical since the
distances of e1 and e2 are specified by d1 and d2 respectively. For
example, consider the branch condition q[i] + η2 ≥ T˜ in Figure 1.
Rule (T-ODOT) first checks types for subexpressions:
Γ ` q[i] + η2 : numq̂[i]+(q[i]+η2≥T˜?2:0) and Γ ` T˜ : num1
Then the following constraint is generated (free variables in the
generated constraint are universally quantified):
∀qi, q̂i, η2, T˜ ∈ R. (−1 ≤ q̂i ≤ 1)⇒
qi + η2 ≥ T˜ ⇔ qi + η2 + q̂i + (qi + η2 ≥ T˜?2 : 0) ≥ T˜ + 1
Typing rules for expressions.
Γ ` r : num0 (T-NUM) Γ ` b : bool (T-BOOLEAN)
Γ, x : Bd ` x : Bd (T-VAR) Γ, x : B∗ ` x : Bx̂ (T-VARSTAR)
Γ ` e1 : numd1 Γ ` e2 : numd2
Γ ` e1 ⊕ e2 : numd1⊕d2
(T-OPLUS)
Γ ` e1 : num0 Γ ` e2 : num0
Γ ` e1 ⊗ e2 : num0 (T-OTIMES)
Γ ` e1 : numd1
Γ ` e2 : numd2
Ψ⇒ (e1  e2
⇔ (e1+d1) (e2+d2))
Γ ` e1  e2 : bool (T-ODOT)
Γ ` e : bool
Γ ` ¬e : bool (T-NEG)
Γ ` e1 : τ Γ ` e2 : list τ
Γ ` e1 :: e2 : list τ (T-CONS)
Γ ` e1 : list τ Γ ` e2 : num0
Γ ` e1[e2] : τ (T-INDEX)
Γ ` e1 : bool Γ ` e2 : τ Γ ` e3 : τ
Γ ` e1?e2 : e3 : τ (T-SELECT)
Typing rules for commands
Γ ` skip⇀ skip (T-SKIP)
Γ ` e : τ Γ ` x : Bd τ = Bd
Γ ` x := e ⇀ x := e (T-ASGN)
Γ ` x : Bx̂ Γ ` e : Bd
Γ ` x := e ⇀ x := e; x̂ := d; (T-ASGNSTAR)
Γ ` c1 ⇀ c′1 Γ ` c2 ⇀ c′2
Γ ` c1; c2 ⇀ c′1; c′2
(T-SEQ)
Γ ` e : num0 or Γ ` e : bool0
Γ ` return e ⇀ return e (T-RETURN)
Γ ` e : bool Γ ` ci ⇀ c′i where i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ ` if e then c1 else c2 ⇀ if e then c′1 else c′2
(T-IF)
Γ ` e : bool Γ ` c ⇀ c′
Γ ` while e do c ⇀ while e do c′ (T-WHILE)
Typing rules for random assignments
Γ(η) = numd
Γ ` η := Lap r ⇀ havoc η;v = v + |d|/r; (T-LAPLACE)
Figure 6. Typing rules. Ψ is an invariant that holds throughout
program execution.
Vars x ∈ Var ∪ H ∪ {v}
Statements c ::= skip | x := e | havoc x | c1; c2 | return e
if e then c1 else c2 | while e do c
Figure 7. Target language syntax. The omitted parts are identical
to the source language defined in Figure 3.
This proof obligation captures a subtle yet important property
of the Sparse Vector method: given the randomness alignment as
specified by Γ, two related executions must take the same branch
(hence, produce the same output). This proof obligation can easily
be discharged by an external SMT solver, such as Z3 (de Moura
and Bjørner 2008).
Target language The typing rules for a command have the form
of Γ ` c ⇀ c′, where c is the original program being verified,
and c′ is the transformed program in the target language defined
in Figure 7. The target language is mostly identical to the original
one, except for two significant differences: 1) the target language
involves a distinguished variables v to explicitly track the privacy
cost in the original program; 2) the target language removes prob-
abilistic expressions, and introduces a new nondeterministic com-
mand (havoc x), which sets variable x to an arbitrary value upon
execution. Hence, the target language is nonprobabilistic.
Due to nondeterminism, the denotational semantics interprets a
command c in the target language as a function JcK :M→ P(M).
For example, the semantics of the havoc command is defined as
follows: Jhavoc xKm = ∪r∈R {m{r/x}}
Other commands have a standard semantics, hence their semantics
are included in the appendix. Note that for simplicity, we abuse the
notation JcK to denote the semantics of both the source language
and target language. However, its meaning is unambiguous in the
context of a memory m: when v 6∈ dom(m), JcKm denotes a
distribution; otherwise, JcKm denotes a set.
Commands Informally, if Γ ` c ⇀ c′, and the distinguished
variable v in c′ is bounded by some constant ′ in all possible
executions, then program c is ′-differentially private. Here, we
discuss important typing rules to enforce this property. We will
formalize this soundness property and sketch a proof in Section 4.
For an assignment x := e, rule (T-ASGN) synthesizes the
types of x and e, and checks that their types are equivalent (i.e.,
both the base type and distance are equivalent). However, rule (T-
ASGNSTAR) instruments the original program so that the typing
invariant (i.e., the distance of x is exactly x̂) is maintained after the
assignment. Consider line 4 in Figure 4. Rule (T-ASGNSTAR) first
checks subexpressions: Γ ` sum + q[i] : ŝum + q̂[i]. Hence, the
transformed program is (sum := sum + q[i]; ŝum := ŝum + q̂[i]),
which correctly maintains the typing invariant after the assignment.
(T-RETURN) checks that the returned value is indistinguishable
in two related executions. Both (T-IF) and (T-WHILE) check that
two related executions must follow the same control flow.
Laplace mechanism Intuitively, (T-LAPLACE) assigns a poly-
morphic type to the random source Lap r. In other words, for any
distance d of random variable η, we can instantiate the type of Lap r
to be numd, though with a privacy cost of |d|/r. Moreover, the trans-
formed program sets η to a nondeterministic value (havoc η), since
any real value can be sampled from the Laplace distribution.
Consider line 1 in Figure 1. (T-LAPLACE) transforms this line
to (havoc η1;v := v+/2) since Γ(η1) = num1. Informally, the
transformation says that by paying a privacy cost of /2, Lap (2/)
ensures that η1 has a distance of one in two related executions.
Moreover, consider line 6 in Figure 4. (T-LAPLACE) transforms
this line to (havoc η;v := v + |ŝum|/b) since Γ(η) = −ŝum.
Informally, the transformation says that by paying a privacy cost,
η has a distance of −ŝum in two related executions. Hence, we can
cancel out the distance of sum in line 7.
Dependent types and imperative programming Mutable states in
imperative programming brings subtleties that are not foreseen in
the standard theory of dependent types (Martin-Lo¨f 1984). Con-
sider a variable x with type numy where y is initialized to zero. The
type of x establishes an invariant on its values v1, v2 under two ex-
ecutions: v(1) = v(2). However, if we update the value of y to 1,
the invariant changes to v(1) + 1 = v(2), but the values of x in two
executions remains unchanged. Hence, the type invariant is broken.
To address this issue, we assume the following assumptions
are checked before type checking. First, for each normal variable
x ∈ Var such that Γ(x) = Bd, all free variables in d are immutable.
For example, each normal variables in Figure 1 has a constant
distance in its type. Note that by language syntax, this restriction
does not apply to variables with a star type. Second, a random
variable η ∈ H may depend on mutable variables. However, we
assume that it has only one use other than the definition, and the
definition of η is adjacent to its use. Hence, each variable that η
depends on appears immutable between η’s definition and use 5.
4. Soundness
The type system in Section 3.3 enforces a fundamental property: if
Γ ` c ⇀ c′ and v in c′ is bounded by some constant , then the
original program being verified is -differentially private.
To formalize and prove this soundness property, we first notice
that a typing environment Γ defines a relation on two memories,
since Γ specifies the exact distance of each variable:
Definition 2 (Γ-Relation). Two memories m1 and m2 are related
by a typing environment Γ, written m1 Γ m2, iff
∀x ∈ Var. m1(x) + JdxKm1 = m2(x), where Γ ` x : Bdx
Note that since Γ(x) might be a dependent type, the definition
needs to evaluate the distance of x (dx) under m1.
By the definition above, Γ is a function since for any memory
m, the distance for each variable in the related memory of m is a
constant. Hence, we also write Γ(m) to represent the unique m′
such that m Γ m′. Moreover, given a set of distinct memories
S ⊆ M, we define Γ S , {Γ(m) | m ∈ S}. Note that by
definition, Γ S is also a set of distinct memories (hence, not a
multiset). Furthermore, we assume that Γ is an injective function.
We make this assumption explicit by the following definition.
Definition 3 (Well-Formed Γ-relation). A typing environment Γ is
well-formed, written ` Γ, iff Γ is an injective function.
Checking well-formedness of the Γ-relation is straightforward.
Intuitively, Γ is well-formed when there is no “circular” depen-
dency, while more careful analysis is needed for circular depen-
dencies. Consider the Sparse Vector method in Figure 1 and any
m1 and m2 such that Γ m1 = Γ m2 = m for some m. For a
variable y with a constant distance v (e.g., T˜ , η1, q̂[i]), we have
m1(y) = m(y) − v = m2(y). So m1 and m2 must agree
on those variables. Then for any variable z that depends on vari-
ables that m1 and m2 already agree on, the distance of z must be
identical in m1 and m2; hence, m1(z) = m2(z). For the circu-
lar dependency on variable η2 (whose distance depends η2), con-
5 The one-use assumption may appear restrictive at first glance, but when
η’s type has no dependency on mutable variables, we can always store η to
a normal variable to circumvent this restriction. When η’s type depends on a
mutable variable and multiple uses of η are needed, we can store η’s value to
a normal variable with star type, whose distance counterpart is manipulated
and reasoned about by the type system.
sider t = JT˜ − q[i]Km1 = JT˜ − q[i]Km2 . The mapping for η2 is
v 7→ v + 2 when v > t and v 7→ v otherwise. Since this mapping
is strictly monotonic, it is injective.
For differential privacy, we are interested in the relationship
between two memory distributions. Given a typing environment Γ
and constant , we define the (Γ, ) distance, written ∆Γ, of two
memory distributions:
Definition 4 (Γ-distance). The Γ-distance of two distributions
µ1, µ2 ∈ Dist(M), written ∆Γ(µ1, µ2), is defined as:
∆Γ(µ1, µ2) , max
S⊆M
(µ1(S)− exp()µ2(Γ S))
Note that when S = ∅, the distance is 0 by definition. So
∆Γ(µ1, µ2) ≥ 0 for any , µ1, µ2.
The soundness theorem connects the “privacy cost” of the prob-
abilistic program to the distinguished variable v in the transformed
nonprobabilistic program. In order to formalize the connection, we
first extend memory in the source language to include v:
Definition 5. For any memory m and constant , there is an
extension of m, written m unionmulti (), so that
∀x ∈ dom(m). m unionmulti ()(x) = m(x)
∧m unionmulti ()(v) = 
Next, we introduce useful lemmas and theorems. First, we show
that the type-directed transformation Γ ` c ⇀ c′ is faithful. In
other words, for any initial memory m and program c, memory m′
is a possible final memory iff for initial extended memory m unionmulti (0)
and c′, one final memory is an extension of m′.
Lemma 1 (Faithfulness).
∀m,m′, c, c′,Γ. Γ ` c ⇀ c′ ⇒JcKm(m′) 6= 0⇔ ∃. m′ unionmulti () ∈ Jc′Kmunionmulti(0)
Proof. By structural induction on c.
For a pair of initial and final memories m0 and m′ when exe-
cuting the original program, we identify a set of possible v values,
so that in the corresponding executions of c′, the initial and final
memories are extensions of m and m′ respectively:
Definition 6. Given a target program c′, an initial memory m0
and a final memory m′, the consistent costs of executing c′ w.r.t.
m0 and m′, written c′ m
′
m0 , is defined as follows
c′ m
′
m0, {′ | m unionmulti (′) ∈ Jc′Km0unionmulti(0) ∧m = m′}
where m = m′ iff ∀x ∈ dom(m). m′(x) = m(x)
Since (c′ mm1) by definition is a set of values of v, we write
max(c′ mm1) for the maximum cost. The next lemma enables
precise reasoning of privacy cost w.r.t. a pair of initial and final
memories when Γ is injective:
Lemma 2 (Point-Wise soundness).
∀c, c′,m1,m2,m,Γ. ` Γ∧ Γ ` c ⇀ c′ ∧m1 Γ m2, we haveJcKm1(m) ≤ exp(max(c′ mm1))JcKm2(Γ(m))
The full proof of Lemma 2 is available in the appendix. We
comment that this point-wise result enables precise reasoning of
privacy cost where the composition theorem falls short. Consider
the transformed Sparse Vector method in Figure 2. This point-wise
result allows various cost bounds to be provided for various memo-
ries: v increments by 2/N when the branch condition is true, but
it remains the same otherwise. On the other hand, methods based
on the composition theorem (e.g., (Reed and Pierce 2010; Gaboardi
Distance Vars α, β, γ ∈ DVar
Distances d ::= · · · | α
Figure 8. LightDP: language syntax extension.
et al. 2013; Barthe et al. 2012, 2014)) have to (conservatively) pro-
vide an unique cost bound for all possible executions, rendering a
cost of 2/N .
The point-wise soundness lemma provides a precise privacy
bound per initial and final memory. However, differential privacy
by definition (Definition 1) bounds the worst-case cost. To close
the gap, we define the worst-case cost of the transformed program.
Definition 7. For any program c in the target language, we say c’s
execution cost is bounded by some constants , written c, iff for
any m unionmulti (0),
m′ unionmulti (′) ∈ JcKmunionmulti(0) ⇒ ′ ≤ 
Note that this safety property can be verified by an external
mechanism such as Hoare logic and model checking. Off-the-shelf
tools can be used to verify that c holds for some . For example,
we have formally proved that the transformed program in Figure 1
satisfies a postcondition v ≤  by providing one line of annotation
(the grey line in Figure 1) using the Dafny tool (Leino 2010).
Theorem 1 (Soundness).
∀c, c′,m1,m2,Γ, . ` Γ∧Γ ` c ⇀ c′∧m1 Γm2∧c′, we have
∆Γ(JcKm1 , JcKm2) ≤ 0
Proof. By definition, (max(c mm1)) ≤  for all m, m1. Hence by
Lemma 2, ∀m. JcKm1(m) ≤ exp()JcKm2(Γ(m)). Hence,
max
S⊆M
(JcKm1(S)− exp()JcKm2(Γ(S)))
= max
S⊆M
∑
m∈S
(JcKm1(m)− exp()JcKm2(Γ(m))) ≤ 0
We note that the equality in the proof above holds due to the
injective assumption (` Γ), which allows us to derive the set-based
privacy from the point-wise privacy (Lemma 2).
We now connect the soundness theorem to differential privacy:
Theorem 2 (Privacy).
∀Γ, c, c′, x, . ` Γ∧Γ ` (c; return e) ⇀ (c′; return e) then
c′ ⇒ c is -differentially private
Proof. Proof is available in the appendix.
5. Differential-Privacy Proof Inference
We have so far presented an explicitly typed language LightDP0.
However, writing down types (especially those dependent types)
for variables is still a non-trivial task. Moreover, when multiple
proofs exist, writing down types accompanied with the minimum
privacy cost is even more challenging. We extend LightDP0 to
automatically infer a proof and even search for the optimal one.
5.1 Type Inference
Since each type has two orthogonal components (base type and dis-
tance), inference is needed for both. The former is mostly standard
(e.g., for Hindley/Milner system (Wand 1987; Aiken and Wimmers
1993; Zhang and Myers 2014)), hence omitted in this paper.
Next, we assume all base types are available, and focus on
the inference of the distance counterpart. For brevity, we write
Γ(x) = d instead of ∃B. Γ(x) = Bd. We use DefVars to represent
the set of variables whose distances are given by the programmer.
To enable type inference, we extend LightDP0 with distance
variables such as α, β, γ (shown in Figure 8). Initially, the typing
environment associates each variable in DefVars with its annotated
distance. It associates each other variable with a distinguished
distance variable to be inferred.
Following the idea of modeling type inference as constraint
solving (e.g., (Wand 1987; Aiken and Wimmers 1993; Haack and
Wells 2004)), it is straightforward to interpret the typing rules in
Figure 6 as a (naive) inference algorithm. To see how, consider two
assignments (x := 0; y := x), where Γ(x) = α,Γ(y) = β. With
distance variables, the typing rules now collect constraints (instead
of checking their validity) during type checking. For example, two
constraints are collected for those two assignments: α = 0 and
β = α. Hence, inferring types is equivalent to finding a solution for
those two constraints (i.e., the satisfiability problem of ∃α, β. α =
0 ∧ β = α). It is easy to check that α = 0 ∧ β = 0 is a solution.
Hence, the inferred distances are Γ(x) = 0,Γ(y) = 0. However,
this naive inference algorithm falls short in face of dependent types.
Next, we first explore the main challenges in inferring dependent
types, and then propose our inference algorithm.
Inferring star types Consider the example in Figure 4. If we
follow the naive inference algorithm above, two constraints are
generated from lines 2 and 4: α = 0 and α = α + q̂[i], where
α = Γ(sum). These constraints are unsatisfiable, since the value
of q̂[i] is an arbitrary value between −1 and 1. Nevertheless, the
powerful type system of LightDP0 still allows formal verification
of this example by assigning sum to the star type, meaning that its
distance is dynamically tracked.
We observe that starting from the initial typing environment, we
can refine it by processing each assignment x := e in the following
way. We first synthesize the type of e from its subexpressions, in
the same fashion as the original typing rules in Figure 6. Then, if
x ∈ DefVars (i.e., given by the programmer), there is nothing
to be refined. Otherwise, we can refine the typing environment by
updating the type of x to a more precise one:
refine(Γ, x, d) ,

Γ{d/α} if Γ(x) = α ∈ DVar
Γ if Γ(x) 6∈ DVar ∧ (Γ(x) = d)
Γ[x 7→ ∗] otherwise
Here, the auxiliary function refine takes an initial environment Γ,
a variable x and a distance expression d. This function replaces all
occurrences of α in Γ to d when Γ(x) is a variable to be inferred
(α ∈ DVar). Otherwise, it statically checks whether the old and new
distance expressions are equivalent. When the equivalence cannot
be determined at static time, it assigns the ∗ type to x.
Our inference algorithm refines the typing environment as it
proceeds. Consider Figure 4 again. At line 4, sum’s distance is
refined to 0. Then at line 6, its distance is refined to ∗, since we
cannot statically check that 0 = 0 + q̂[i] is valid.
Inferring dependency on program state Consider Figure 1 where
only the type of η2 is to be inferred. The naive inference algorithm
will generate one constraint for the branch condition in line 6:
∀qi, q̂i, η2, T˜ . (−1 ≤ q̂i ≤ 1)⇒
(qi + η2 ≥ T˜ ⇔ (qi + η2 + q̂i + α ≥ T˜ + 1)
which is unsatisfiable, since there is no single value α that can hide
the difference of qi in both directions. We need a more precise type
for η2 (as provided in Figure 1) so that the “if” and “else” branches
can be aligned in different ways.
To infer dependent types, our inference algorithm propagates
context information to subexpressions. In particular, we observe
that only rule (T-ODOT) generates a constraint that may benefit
Refinement rules for expressions
Γ;P on r : Γ (R-NUM)
b ∈ {true, false}
Γ;P on b : Γ (R-BOOLEAN)
Γ;P on x : Γ (R-VAR)
P = ∅
Γ;P on η : Γ (R-RAND)
P 6= ∅ αt, αf fresh variables
Γ;P on η : refine(Γ, η,P?αt : αf ) (R-RAND-REFINE)
Γ;P on e1 : Γ1 Γ1;P on e2 : Γ2 op ∈ ⊕ ∪ ⊗
Γ;P on e1 op e2 : Γ2 (R-OPS)
Γ;P ∧ (e1  e2) on e1 :Γ1 Γ1;P ∧ (e1  e2) on e2 :Γ2
Γ;P on e1  e2 : Γ2 (R-ODOT)
Γ;P on e1 : Γ1 Γ1;P on e2 : Γ2
Γ;P on e1 :: e2 : Γ2 (R-CONS)
Γ;P on e : Γ′
Γ;P on ¬e :Γ′ (R-NEG)
Γ;P on e1 :Γ1 Γ1;P on e2 :Γ2
Γ;P on e1[e2] : Γ2 (R-IDX)
Refinement rules for commands
Γ on skip : Γ
(R-SKIP)
Γ on return e : Γ
(R-RETURN)
x 6∈ DefVars Γ, ∅ on e : Γ′ Γ′ ` e : d
Γ on x := e : refine(Γ′, x, d)
(R-ASGN-REF)
x ∈ DefVars Γ, ∅ on e : Γ′
Γ on x := e : Γ′
(R-ASGN)
Γ on c1 : Γ′ Γ′ on c2 : Γ′′
Γ on c1; c2 : Γ′′
(R-SEQ)
Γ; ∅ on e : Γ1 Γ1 on c1 : Γ2 Γ2 on c2 : Γ3
Γ on if e then c1 else c2 : Γ3
(R-IF)
Γ; ∅ on e : Γ1 Γ1 ≤ Γ2 Γ2 on c : Γ2
Γ on while e do c : Γ2
(R-WHILE)
Refinement for random assignments
Γ on η := Lap r : Γ
(R-LAPLACE)
Figure 9. The refinement algorithm.
from dependency on program states. Hence, our inference algo-
rithm propagates the comparison result to its subexpressions, and
refine subexpressions (e.g., η2) for the needed dependency.
Inference algorithm We now present our inference algorithm,
which is still based on the typing rules in Figure 6. However, to
tackle the challenges above, we run a refinement algorithm before
type inference. The algorithm is shown in Figure 9.
For expressions, the refinement algorithm propagates context
information P to subexpressions. Hence, each rule for expression
has the form of Γ,P on e : Γ′, where P is a predicate that may
appear in a dependent type, Γ is the typing environment to be re-
fined, and Γ′ is the refined environment. The context informationP
is used to refine distance of a random variable η in rule (R-RAND-
REFINE). Note that the refinement is not needed for a normal vari-
able x (rule (R-VAR)). Intuitively, the reason is that the “shape” of
x is either provided or has been refined when x is initialized. How-
ever, this is not true for a random variable: η can have any distance
expression according to rule (T-LAPLACE).
The refinement rules for commands have the form of Γ on c : Γ′.
As we described informally above, rule (R-ASGN-REF) refines
the distance of x using the refine function when its distance is
not given. The rule (R-WHILE) assumes that a fixed point exists.
Based on the definition of the refine function, a fixed point can
be computed as follows. We define≤ as the lifted relation based on
a point-wise lattice (for each variable) where: ∀α, β ∈ DVar. α ≤
β ∧ β ≤ α and α ≤ d ≤ ∗ if d is not a distance variable. We
can compute a fixed point by Γ1 = Γ0 ` c : Γ1,Γ1 ` c :
Γ2, · · · until Γi ` c : Γi for some i. Based on the definition
of the refine function, it is easy to check that Γi ≤ Γi+1 and
the computation terminates since whenever Γi 6= Γi+1, either
the number of distance variables is reduced by one, or one more
variable has a star type.
Example We consider type inference for our running example in
Figure 1 where all local variables are to be inferred. We first run
the refinement algorithm. The first refinement happens at line 2,
where the distance of T˜ is refined to α, the distance variable of
η1. At line 3, c1, c2 and i are refined to distance 0. In the loop
body, η2 is refined to q[i] + η2 ≥ T˜?β : γ at line 6, using
rule (R-RAND-REFINE). At line 8, refine(Γ, c1, 0) returns Γ
since 0 = 0 is always true. Similar for the “else” branch and line
12. Hence, the environment after line 12 is already a fixed point
for the loop body. Hence, the typing environment after refinement
is: Γ(c1) = Γ(c2) = Γ(i) = 0, Γ(T˜ ) = Γ(η1) = α and
Γ(η2) = (q[i] + η2 ≥ T˜ )?β : γ.
Type checking with distance variables With type variables in the
refined environment Γ, the type system collects constraints during
type checking, and tries to solve the collected constraints where
the type variables are existentially qualified. For example, with
type refinement, type checking the partial sum example in Figure 4
yields a unique solution, which is identical to the type annotation
in the figure. In general, collected constraint may have multiple
solutions. For example, type checking the Sparse Vector method
generates only one (nontrivial) constraint from the rule (T-ODOT):
(∀qi, q̂i, η2, T˜ ∈ R. (−1 ≤ q̂i ≤ 1)⇒
qi + η2 ≥ T˜ ⇔ qi + q̂i + η2 + (qi + η2 ≥ T˜?β : γ) ≥ T˜ +α
)
It is easy to check that the type annotation in Figure 1 (i.e.,
α = 1, β = 2, γ = 0) is a solution of the constraint. But in fact,
other solutions exist. For example, α = 0, β = 2, γ = −2 and
α = 2, β = 3, γ = 0 are both valid solutions. The type system
can either pick a solution, or defer the inference by transforming
the original program to a target program where type variables are
treated as unknown program inputs (as shown in Figure 10).
5.2 Minimizing Privacy Cost
With type variables captured explicitly in the transformed program,
we can verify that the postcondition v = α2 +
β
2
+c2× γ
2N
holds
by providing the loop invariant shown in grey. Hence, combined
with the remaining unsolved constraints on those type variables,
finding the optimal proof is equivalent to the following MaxSMT
function MSPARSEVEC (T,N : num; q : list num; q̂ : list num;
α, β, γ : num)
returns out : list num
precondition ∀i. −1 ≤ (q̂[i]) ≤ 1
1 v := 0;
2 havoc η1;v := v + (α/2);
3 T˜ := T + η1;
4 c1 := 0; c2 := 0; i := 0;
5 while (c1 < N)
6 Invariant : c1 ≤ N ∧ v = α2 + c1× β2N + c2× γ2N
7 havoc η2;v := v + (q[i] + η2 ≥ T˜?β : γ)× /4c;
8 if (q[i] + η2 ≥ T˜) then
9 out:= true::out;
10 c1 := c1+1;
11 else
12 out:= false::out;
13 c2 := c2+1;
14 i := i+1;
Figure 10. The target program with unknown type variables. The
instrumented statements are underlined.
problem, where M is a large number since c2 is not bounded:
min(
α
2
+
β
2
+M × γ) such that(∀qi, q̂i, η2, T˜ ∈ R. (−1 ≤ q̂i ≤ 1)⇒
qi + η2 ≥ T˜ ⇔ qi + q̂i + η2 + (qi + η2 ≥ T˜?β : γ) ≥ T˜ +α
)
Using a MaxSMT solver µZ (Bjørner and Phan 2014; Bjørner
et al. 2015), we successfully find the optimal solution for the type
variables: α = 1, β = 2, γ = 0. This is exactly the randomness
alignment used in its formal proof (Dwork and Roth 2014).
We note that the translation to the MaxSMT problem at this
stage still requires programmer efforts (e.g., identifying the cost
bound involving type variables and converting the cost bound to an
equivalent formula suitable for a MaxSMT solver). However, this
example clearly demonstrates the potential benefits of explicitly
calculating the privacy cost in the target language.
5.3 Proof Automation
In general, a LightDP-based proof consists four steps involving
manual efforts: 1) writing down the program specification (i.e., the
function signature that specifies private and non-private parameters
and return values), 2) writing down the type annotations for local
variables, 3) verifying that the privacy cost in the transformed
program is bounded by either a known budget, or (MaxSMT only) a
formula involving unsolved type variables, and 4) (MaxSMT only)
solving the MaxSMT problem of “min(upper bound formula) such
that constraints from step 2 are satisfiable”.
As most verification tools, LightDP requires a programmer to
write down specification (step 1). For step 2, we find that the infer-
ence algorithm in Section 5.1 is powerful enough to automatically
infer the types for the nontrivial algorithms considered in this pa-
per6. For step 3 and step 4, LightDP relies on the automation in
existing verification tools. We note that though LightDP currently
adds no automation in step 3 and 4, separating relational reasoning
from counting privacy cost and automating task 2 greatly simpli-
fies those steps for all examples that we have seen so far. We leave
systematic research in automating the entire proof as future work.
6 The only exception is the algorithm in Section 6.3, since the algorithm
uses a uniformly distributed random source which is currently absent in the
inference algorithm.
function NUMSPARSEVECTOR (T,N,  : num0 ; q : list num∗ )
returns (out : list num0 )
precondition ∀i. −1 ≤ (q̂[i]) ≤ 1
c1, c2, i : num0; T˜ , η1 : num1; η2 : numq[i]+η2≥T˜?2:0; η3 : num−q̂[i]
1 η1 := Lap (3/);
2 T˜ := T + η1;
3 c1 := 0; c2 := 0; i := 0;
4 while (c1 < N)
5 η2:= Lap (6N/);
6 if (q[i] + η2 ≥ T˜) then
7 η3:= Lap (3N/);
8 out:= (q[i]+η3)::out;
9 c1 := c1 + 1;
10 else
11 out:= 0::out;
12 c2 := c2 + 1;
13 i := i+1;
The transformed program, where underlined commands are added by the
type system. Only one annotation (loop invariant) is needed from the pro-
grammer to verify the postcondition v ≤ : c1 ≤ N∧v = 3+c1× 23N .
1 v := 0;
2 havoc η1;v := v + /3;
3 T˜ := T + η1;
4 c1 := 0; c2 := 0; i := 0;
5 while (c1 < N)
6 havoc η2;v := v + (q[i] + η2 ≥ T˜?2 : 0)× /6N ;
7 if (q[i] + η2 ≥ T˜ ) then
8 havoc η3;v := v + |q̂[i]| × /3N ;
9 out:= (q[i]+η3)::out;
10 c1 := c1 + 1;
11 else
12 out:= 0::out;
13 c2 := c2 + 1;
14 i := i+1
Figure 11. The Numerical Sparse Vector method.
6. Case Studies
6.1 Sparse Vector with Numerical Answers
We first study a numerical variant of the Sparse Vector method. The
previous version (Figure 1), produces only two types of outputs for
each query: true, meaning the query answer is probably above
the threshold; and false, meaning that it is probably below. The
numerical variant, shown in Figure 11, replaces the output true
with a noisy query answer. It does this by drawing fresh Laplace
noise and adding it to the query (Line 8).
Verification using LightDP LightDP can easily verify this nu-
merical variant from scratch, in a very similar way as verifying
the Sparse Vector method. However, here we focus on another
interesting scenario of using LightDP: the programmer (or algo-
rithm designer) has already verified the Sparse Vector method using
LightDP, and she is now exploring its variations. This is a common
scenario for algorithm designers. We show that since LightDP au-
tomatically fills in most proof details, exploring variations of an
algorithm requires little effort.
In particular, we assume the programmer has already obtained
the (optimal) types for all local variables except η3, and the loop
invariant shown in Figure 2 from the verification of the Sparse
Vector method. Hence, the type inference engine only needs to infer
a type for η3, which is trivially solved to be num−q̂[i]. Moreover,
LightDP transforms the original program to the one on the bottom
of Figure 11. To finish the proof, according to Theorem 2, it is
sufficient to verify the postcondition that v ≤ . In fact, only one
annotation (shown in Figure 11) that is very close to the one in
Figure 2 is needed to finish the proof. Hence, we just proved the
numerical Sparse Vector variant for (almost) free using LightDP.
Incorrect variants The numerical variant is also historically in-
teresting since it fixes a bug in a very influential set of lecture notes
(Roth 2011); these lecture notes inadverantly re-used the same
noise used for the “if” test (Line 7) instead of drawing new noise
when outputting the noisy query answer. In other words, Lines 5-8
in Figure 1 are replaced with:
η2:= Lap (2N/);
q˜ = q[i] + η2
if (q˜ ≥ T˜) then
out:= (q˜)::out;
For this incorrect variant, the refinement algorithm refines the type
of q˜ to be q̂[i] +α when q˜ is defined, where Γ(η2) = α. Moreover,
during type checking, ((q˜) :: out) generates a constraint (q̂[i]+α =
0) by rule (T-CONS). Hence, it must be true that Γ(q˜) = num0
and Γ(η2) = num−q̂[i] after type inference. Moreover, after type
checking, η2 := Lap (2N/) is transformed to
(havoc η2;v := v + |q̂[i]|(/2N))
However, we cannot prove that the incorrect variant is ′-private for
any ′. The reason is that v in the transformed program is clearly
not bounded by any constant ′: v increments by /2N in the
worst case in each loop iteration, but the number of iterations is
unbounded (when most iterations take the “else” branch).
The failure of a formal proof of the incorrect variant also sheds
lights on how to fix it. For example, if we bound the number of
iterations to be N , then the incorrect variant is fixed (though with a
different privacy cost).
6.2 Smart Summation
We next study a smart summation algorithm verified previously
(with heavy annotations) in (Barthe et al. 2012, 2014). The pseudo
code, shown in Figure 12, is adapted from (Barthe et al. 2014). The
goal of this smart sum algorithm is to take a finite sequence of bits
q[0], q[1], . . . , q[T ] and output a noisy version of their partial sum
sequence: q[0], q[0] + q[1], . . . ,
∑T
i=0 q[i]. One naive approach
is to add Laplace noise to each partial sum (partial implementation
is shown in Figure 4). An alternative naive algorithm is to compute
a noisy bit q˜[i] = q[i]+Lap(1/) for each i and output q˜[0], q˜[0]+
q˜[1], . . . ,
∑T
i=0 q˜[i]. However, in both approaches, the noise will
swamp the true counts.
A much smarter approach was proposed by Chan et al. (2011).
Intuitively, their algorithm groups q into nonoverlapping blocks
of size M . So block G1 = {q[0], q[1], . . . , q[M − 1]}, G2 =
{q[M ], q[M+1], q[M+2], . . . , q[2M−1]}, etc. Then it maintains
2 levels of noisy counts: (1) the noisy bits q˜[i] = q[i]+Lap(1/) for
each i, and (2) the noisy block sums G˜j =
∑
i∈Gj q[i]+Lap(1/)
for each block. The partial sums are computed from these noisy
counts in the following way. Consider the sum of the first `+1 bits:∑`
i=0 q[i]. We can represent `+1 = xM+cwhere x = b `+1M c and
c = `+1 mod M . Hence, the noisy partial sum can be computed
from the noisy sum of the first x blocks plus the remaining c noisy
bits: G˜1 +G˜2 + · · ·+G˜x+
c−1∑
j=0
q˜[xB+j]. This algorithm is shown
in Figure 12. The “if” branch keeps track of block boundaries and is
responsible for summing up the noisy blocks. The “else” branch is
responsible for adding in the remaining loose noisy bits (once there
are enough loose bits to form a new blockGj , we use its noisy sum
G˜j rather than the sum of its noisy bits).
function SMARTSUM (, M, T: num0 ; q: list num∗ )
returns (out : list num0 )
precondition ∀i. −1 ≤ (q̂[i]) ≤ 1 ∧
(∀i. q̂[i] 6= 0⇒ (∀j 6= i. q̂[j] = 0))
next, n, i : num0; sum : num∗; η1 : num−ŝum−q̂[i]; η2 : num−q̂[i]
1 next:=0; n:=0; i:=0; sum := 0;
2 while i ≤ T
3 if (i + 1) mod M = 0 then
4 η1 := Lap 1/;
5 n := n + sum + q[i] + η1;
6 next:= n;
7 sum := 0;
8 out := next::out;
9 else
10 η2 := Lap 1/;
11 next:= next + q[i] + η2;
12 sum := sum + q[i];
13 out := next::out;
14 i := i+1;
The transformed program, where underlined commands are added by the
type system. Only one annotation (loop invariant) is needed from the pro-
grammer to verify the postcondition v ≤ 2: (v + ŝum > 0 ⇒ ∀j ≥
i. q̂[j] = 0) ∧ (ŝum > 0⇒ v ≤ ) ∧ (ŝum ≤ 1.0) ∧ (v ≤ 2)
1 v = 0;
2 next:=0, n:=0, i:= 0, sum:=0;ŝum := 0;
3 while i ≤ T
4 if (i + 1) mod M = 0 then
5 havoc η1;v := v + |ŝum+ q̂[i]|;
6 n := n + sum + q[i] + η1;
7 next:= n;
8 sum := 0;
9 ŝum := 0;
10 out := next::out;
11 else
12 havoc η2;v := v + |q̂[i]|;
13 next:= next + q[i] + η2;
14 sum := sum + q[i];
15 ŝum := ŝum+ |q̂[i]|;
16 out := next::out;
17 i := i+1;
Figure 12. The SmartSum algorithm.
Assume for two adjacent databases, at most one query answer
differs, and for that query, its distance is at most one (this adja-
cency assumption is provided as the precondition in function signa-
ture). Hence, for queries that generate the same answer on adjacent
databases, no privacy cost is paid. However, privacy cost is paid
twice to hide the query answers that differ: when the noisy sum for
the block containing that query is computed, and when the noisy
version of that query is used. Hence informally, the SmartSum al-
gorithm satisfies 2-privacy where  is a function parameter.
Verification using LightDP LightDP successfully infers the type
annotations shown in the box under function signature in Figure 12.
Since all type variables are only involved in equality constraints,
only one solution exists. The transformed program is shown at the
bottom of Figure 12.
By Theorem 2, to prove SmartSum is 2-private, it is sufficient
to verify that the postcondition v ≤ 2 holds for the transformed
program. We notice that this program maintains the loop invariant
shown in Figure 12. One observation is that once the privacy cost or
the distance of variable sum gets positive, the query that generates
different answers must have been handled already. Hence, rest
queries must have identical answers on adjacent databases ((v +
function PRIVBERNOULLI (t : num∗ )
returns b : bool
precondition 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 ∧ 0 ≤ t+ t̂ ≤ 1
1 η := Uniform[0,1];
2 if (η ≤ t) then
3 b := true;
4 else
5 b := false;
The transformed program where underlined commands are added by the
type system:
1 v :=0;
2 havoc η;v = v − log(1 + (η ≤ t)?(t̂ ≥ 0?0 : (t̂/t))
: (t̂ ≤ 0?0 : (t̂/t)));
3 if (η ≤ t) then
4 b := true;
5 else
6 b := false;
Figure 13. The PrivBernoulli algorithm.
ŝum > 0 ⇒ ∀j ≥ i. q̂[j] = 0)). Using the loop invariant, we
formally verified the desired postcondition v ≤ 2 using Dafny.
6.3 Categorical Outputs
Until now, we have used the Laplace mechanism, which gener-
ates numerical outputs, as the primary randomization tool for en-
suring differential privacy. It might seem that categorical attributes
would require completely different techniques, but indeed, they can
be cleanly incorporated into LightDP with a new typing rule. We
briefly show how this can be done by considering a simple mech-
anism that takes a private-data-dependent probability t and outputs
true with probability t and false with probability 1 − t. The al-
gorithm shown in Figure 13.
The standard trick of generating an output truewith probability
t can be done by generating an uniform [0,1] random variable x and
returning true if x ≤ t, and false otherwise. This trick converts
numerical randomness into categorical randomness with a notion
of distance that can be aligned between executions under related
databases. Generalizations to a larger output domain are routine
and, in this way, can allow some instantiations of the exponential
mechanism (McSherry and Talwar 2007).
To calculate the privacy cost of aligning the binary output, we
need to add a single typing rule to capture the property of uniform
[0,1] distribution:
Γ(η) = numη·d − 1 < d ≤ 0
Γ ` η := Uniform[0,1] ⇀ havoc[0,1]η;v = v − log(d + 1)
This rule requires that the random sample is aligned by a dis-
tance of η · d for some d (i.e., we map η to (d + 1)η in the ran-
domness alignment). Easy to check this mapping is injective. By
property of uniform distribution, the privacy cost of any such as-
signment is − log(d + 1) where −1 ≤ d ≤ 0.
To integrate this typing rule and uniform distribution into
LightDP, we need to establish that: 1) the faithfulness of the trans-
formation, and 2) the uniform distribution satisfies Lemma 2. The
former is easy to check, and we establish the latter in the appendix.
With this new typing rule for uniform distribution, we can
precisely compute the privacy cost of the algorithm in Figure 13
by providing the following type for η: Γ(η) = η · d where
d = (η ≤ t)?(t̂ ≥ 0?0 : (t̂/t))
:(t̂ ≤ 0?0 : (t̂/t))
During type checking, rule (T-ODOT) checks the following con-
straint for the branch condition η ≤ t⇔ η + η · d ≤ t+ t̂, which
can be discharged by a SMT solver. Hence, the algorithm is trans-
formed to the program at the bottom of Figure 13. By the fact that
the newly added random source and typing rules satisfies Lemma 2,
the privacy cost of this subtle example is provably bounded by the
transformed cost formula in the transformed program 7.
7. Related Work
Type systems for differential privacy Fuzz (Reed and Pierce
2010) and its successor DFuzz (Gaboardi et al. 2013) reason about
the sensitivity (i.e., how much does a function magnify distances
between inputs) of a program. DFuzz combines linear indexed
types and lightweight dependent types to allow rich sensitivity
analysis. However, those systems rely on (without verify) external
mechanisms (e.g., Laplace mechanism, Sparse Vector method) as
trusted black boxes to release final query answers, without veri-
fying those black boxes. LightDP, on the other hand, verifies so-
phisticated privacy-preserving mechanisms that releases those final
answers. Sensitivity inference (D’Antoni et al. 2013) was proposed
in the context of Fuzz. While sensitivity inference shares the same
goal of minimizing type annotation and it also uses SMT solvers,
the very different type system in LightDP brings unique challenges
(Section 5.1) that do not present in Fuzz.
HOARe2 (Barthe et al. 2015) and its extension PrivInfer (Barthe
et al. 2016a) have the ability to relate a pair of expressions via
relational assertions that appear as refinements in types. Hence,
they can verify mechanisms that privately release final query an-
swers as well as private Bayesian inference algorithms. However,
HOARe2 and PrivInfer incur heavy annotation burden on program-
mers. Moreover, they can not deal with privacy-preserving algo-
rithms that go beyond the composition theorem (e.g., the Sparse
Vector method).
Program logic for differential privacy Probabilistic relational
program logic (Barthe et al. 2012, 2013; Barthe and Olmedo 2013;
Barthe et al. 2016c,b) use custom relational logics to verify dif-
ferential privacy. These systems have successfully verified privacy
for many advanced examples. However, only the very recent work
by Barthe et al. (2016c,b) can verify the Sparse Vector method.
While these logics are expressive enough to prove (, δ) privacy,
the main difficulty with these approaches is that they use custom
and complex logics that incurs steep learning curve and heavy an-
notation burden. Moreover, ad hoc rules for loops are needed for
many advanced examples.
The work by Barthe et al. (2014) transforms a probabilistic re-
lational program to a nondeterministic program, where standard
Hoare logic can be used to reason about privacy. However, the fun-
damental difference between that work and LightDP is that the for-
mer cannot verify sophisticated algorithms where the composition
theorem falls short, since it lacks the power to express subtle de-
pendency between privacy cost and memory state. Moreover, be-
neath the surface, that work and LightDP are built on very different
principals and proof techniques. Further, their approach requires
7 We note that without LightDP, the precise calculation of privacy cost
is very difficult and error-prone. To show that the randomness alignment
cancels out the difference in the private-data-dependent probability t, we
need to analyze four cases. When outputting true and t̂ ≥ 0, the related
execution must output true as well (η ≤ t ∧ t̂ ≥ 0 ⇒ η ≤ t + t̂).
When outputting true and t̂ < 0, this alignment maps η to η(d + 1) =
η((t+ t̂)/t). Hence, true is the output in the related execution (η ≤ t⇒
η(t+ t̂)/t ≤ t+ t̂). Similar reasoning applies to the case outputting false
too. Moreover, connecting this alignment to -privacy require is even more
daunting by a paper-and-pencil proof.
heavier annotation burden since both relational and functional (e.g.,
bounding privacy cost) properties are reasoned about in the trans-
formed program, while the former is completely and automatically
handled by the type system of LightDP.
The notion of aligning randomness has been used in the re-
cent coupling method (Barthe et al. 2016c,b). While the coupling
method is capable of proving (, δ) privacy and it does not require
the injective assumption on the alignment, the cost of doing so is
the steep learning curve and heavy annotation burden. Technically,
the coupling method reasons about privacy for each possible output
(or a set of outputs), while the alignment-based theory used in this
paper aligns two program executions that will produce the same re-
sults. The theory in this paper gives a simple proof, a light-weight
type system, and clear insight behind the type system.
Other language-based methods for differential privacy Several
dynamic tools exist for enforcing differential privacy. PINQ (Mc-
Sherry 2009) tracks (at runtime) the privacy budget consumption,
and terminates the computation when the privacy budget is ex-
hausted. Airavat (Roy et al. 2010) is a MapReduce-based system
with a runtime monitor that enforces privacy policies controlled
by data providers. Recent work by Ebadi et al. (2015) proposed
Personalised Differential Privacy (PDP), where each individual has
its own personal privacy level and a dynamic system that imple-
ments PDP. There are also methods based on computing bisimu-
lations families for probabilistic automata (Tschantz et al. 2011;
Xu et al. 2014). However, none of these techniques has the expres-
sive power to provide a tight privacy cost bound for sophisticated
privacy-preserving algorithms.
8. Conclusions and Future Work
The increased usage and deployment of differentially private al-
gorithms underscores the need for formal verification methods to
ensure that personal information is not leaked due to mistakes or
carelessness. The ability to verify subtle algorithms should be cou-
pled with the ability to infer most of the proofs of correctness to
reduce the programmer burden during the development and subse-
quent maintenance of a privacy-preserving code base.
In this paper, we present a language with a lightweight type
system that allows us to separate privacy computation from the
alignment of random variables in hypothetical executions under
related databases. Thus enabling inference and search for proofs
with the minimal privacy costs.
These techniques allow us to verify (with much fewer annota-
tions) algorithms that were out of reach of the state of the art un-
til recently. However, additional extensions are possible. The first
challenge is to extend these methods to algorithms that use hid-
den private state to reduce privacy costs. One example is the noisy
max algorithm that adds noise to each query and returns the index
of the query with the largest noisy answer (although all noisy an-
swers are used in this computation, the fact that their values are
kept secret allows more refined reasoning to replace the composi-
tion theorem). The second challenge is verifying subtle algorithms
such as PrivTree (Zhang et al. 2016), in which intermediate pri-
vacy costs depend on the data (hence cannot be released) but their
sum can be bounded in a data-independent way. This is another
case where the composition theorem can fail since it requires data-
independent privacy costs. Lastly, LightDP currently only verifies
-privacy, which has a nice point-wise property. We leave extending
LightDP to (, δ)-privacy as future work.
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Appendix
A. Soundness Proof
In the source language semantics (Figure 5), the variable that a
star-typed variable depends on (e.g., ŝum in Figure 4) is invisible.
We first extend the semantics to make the manipulation of such
invisible variables explicit, by the following rule for assignments:Jx := eKm = unit (m{JeKm/x}{JdKm/x̂}) when Γ(x) = num∗,
where Γ(e) = d.
It is straightforward to check that the extended semantics (pa-
rameterized on the type system) is consistent with the original se-
mantics in Figure 5, as it does not change the distribution on the
variables that are visible in the source program. The extended se-
mantics is needed to close the gap between the source language and
the one that formal reasoning is applied on.
Next, we prove a few auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 3.
∀m1,m2,Γ s.t. m1 Γ m2, we have
∀m. unitm1(m) = unitm2(Γ(m))
Proof. By the fact that Γ is a function.
Lemma 4 (Expression).
∀e,m1,m2,Γ s.t. m1 Γ m2 ∧ Γ ` e : Bd, we haveJeKm1 + JdKm1 = JeKm2
Proof. Induction on the structure of e. Interesting cases are follows.
When e is x or η, result is true by the definition of m1 Γ m2.
When e is e1 ⊕ e2, let JeiKm1 = vi, JeiKm2 = v′i and Γ ` ei :
Bidi for i ∈ {1, 2}. Then by typing rule, we have d = d1 + d2. By
induction hypothesis, we have v′i = vi + di, where di = JdiKm1 .
Hence, JeKm2 = v′1 ⊕ v′2 = (v1 + d1)⊕ (v2 + d2) = (v1 ⊕ v2) +
(d1 ⊕ d2) = Je1 ⊕ e2Km1 + Jd1 ⊕ d2Km1 = JeKm1 + JdKm1 .
When e = e1  e2, let Γ ` ei : Bidi for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Then by induction hypothesis, we have JeiKm1 + JdiKm1 =JeiKm2 for i ∈ {1, 2}. By rule (T-ODOT), for any memory m,Je1  e2Km = J(e1 + d1) (e2 + d2)Km. Hence, Je1  e2Km1 =J(e1 + d1) (e2 + d2)Km1 = Je1 + d1Km1  Je2 + d2Km1 =Je1Km2  Je2Km2 = Je1  e2Km2 .
Proof of Lemma 2
∀c, c′,m1,m2,m,Γ. ` Γ∧ Γ ` c ⇀ c′ ∧m1 Γ m2, we haveJcKm1(m) ≤ exp(max(c′ mm1))JcKm2(Γ(m))
Proof. By structural induction on c.
• Case skip: c′ = skip by typing rule. Hence, max(c′ mm1) =
0. Desired result is true by Lemma 3 and the semantics of skip.
• Case x := e: by the transformation, we have max(c′ mm1) = 0.
Hence, by the semantics and Lemma 3, it is sufficient to show
that the memories after the assignment are related by Γ.
We first show m′1(x) + JdKm′1 = m′2(x).
When Γ(x) = Bd, we need to show that m′1 Γ m′2 where
m′1 = m1{JeKm1/x} and m′2 = m2{JeKm2/x} by the
semantics. By typing rule, we have Γ ` e : Bd as well.
By Lemma 4, JeKm1 + JdKm1 = JeKm2 . Hence, we have
m′1(x)+JdKm1 = m′2(x). Since d may only depend on im-
mutable variables in this case, JdKm1 = JdKm′1 . Som′1(x)+JdKm′1 = m′2(x) as desired.
When Γ(x) = B∗, Γ ` x : Bx̂. Hence, m′1(x) +m′1(x̂) =JeKm1 + JdKm1 , where Γ(e) = d, by the extended seman-
tics. By Lemma 4, this is identical to JeKm2 , which ism′2(x)
by the semantics.
Second, we show m′1(y) + JdKm′1 = m′2(y), where Γ ` y : d
for y ∈ dom(Γ)∧y 6= x. When y ∈ Var, its type cannot depend
on x, which is mutable. So the desired result is true. For η ∈ H,
its type only depends on the memory state when η is used. So
the desired result is true as well.
• Case if e then c1 else c2: by typing rule, Γ ` e : bool0. By
Lemma 4, JeKm1 = JeKm2 . Hence, the same branch is taken in
m1 and m2. Desired result is true by induction hypothesis.
• Case c1; c2: For any m such that Jc1; c2Km1(m) 6= 0, there
exists some m′ such thatJc1Km1(m′) 6= 0 ∧ Jc2Km′(m) 6= 0
By induction hypothesis, we haveJc1Km1(m′) ≤ exp(1)Jc1KΓ(m1)(Γ(m′))
Jc2Km′(m) ≤ exp(2)Jc2KΓ(m′)(Γ(m))
where 1 = max(c′1 m
′
m1) and 2 = max(c2 mm′). Hence,
Jc1Km1(m′) · Jc2Km′(m) ≤
exp(1 + 2)Jc1KΓ(m1)(Γ(m′)) · Jc2KΓ(m′)(Γ(m))
Notice thatm′unionmulti(1) ∈ Jc1Km1unionmulti(0) andmunionmulti(2) ∈ Jc2Km′unionmulti(0)
since 1 and 2 maximize privacy costs among consistent exe-
cutions by definition. Hence, m unionmulti (1 + 2) ∈ Jc′1; c′2Km1unionmulti(0).
Therefore, 1 + 2 ≤ max(c1; c2 mm1).
So for any m,
Jc1; c2Km1(m) = ∑
m′
Jc1Km1(m′) · Jc2Km′(m)
≤ exp(′)
∑
m′
Jc1KΓ(m1)(Γ(m′)) · Jc2KΓ(m′)(Γ(m))
≤ exp(′)
∑
m′
Jc1KΓ(m1)(m′) · Jc2Km′(Γ(m))
≤ exp(′)Jc1; c2Km2(Γ(m))
where ′ = max(c1; c2 mm1). Notice that the change of vari-
able in the second to last inequality only holds when Γ is an
injective (but not necessarily onto) mapping, which is true due
to the assumption ` Γ.
• Case while e do c: let W = while e do c. By typing rule,
Γ ` e : bool0. Hence, JeKm′1 = JeKm′2 for any m′1 Γ m′2.
We proceed by by natural induction on the number of loop
iterations (denoted by i) under m1.
When i = 0, JbKm1 = false. So JbKm2 = false since
m1 Γ m2. By semantics, JW Km1 = unit m1 and JW Km2 =
unit m2, and max(W mm1) = 0. Desired result is true by
Lemma 3.
Consider i = j + 1. JbKm1 = true. So JbKm2 = true since
m1 Γ m2. By semantics, JW Kmi = Jc;W Kmi for i ∈ {1, 2},
and the latter W iterates for j times. By induction hypothesis
and a similar argument as the sequential case, JW Km1(m) ≤
exp(max(W mm1)JW Km2(Γ(m)).
• Case η := Lap r: let µr = Lap r. Since µr is the Laplace
distribution with a scale factor of r, we have
∀v, d ∈ R. µr(v) ≤ exp(|d| × r)µr(v + d)
When @v. m = m1{v/η} , Jη := Lap rKm1(m) = 0 by the
semantics. Hence, desired inequality is trivial.
When m = m1{v/η} for some constant v, we have for any
d ∈ R, Jη := Lap rKm1(m)
= µr(v)
≤ exp(|d| · r)µr(v + d)
Let Γ(η) = numd and JdKm = d for some constant d. Since
m1 Γ m2, m1{v/η} Γ m2{v + d/η}. That is, Γ(m) =
m2{v + d/η}. By the semantics,Jη := Lap rKm2(Γ(m)) = Jη := Lap rKm2(m2{v + d/η})
= µr(v + d)
Hence, we haveJη := Lap rKm1(m) ≤ exp(|d| · r)Jη := Lap rKm2(Γ(m))
when m = m1{v/η} for some constant v too. By the typing
rule (T-LAPLACE), the transformed program is (havoc η;v :=
v+ |d| · r). Hence, max(c′1 mm0) = J|d| · rKm = |JdKm| · r =|d| · r. Therefore, we showed that
Jη := Lap rKm1(m) ≤
exp(max(c′1 mm0))Jη := Lap rKm2(Γ(m))
Proof of Theorem 2
∀Γ, c, c′, x, . ` Γ∧Γ ` (c; return e) ⇀ (c′; return e) then
c′ ⇒ c is -private
Proof. By the soundness theorem (Theorem 1), we have for any in-
jective Γ, m1 Γ m2, ∀S ⊆ M, JcKm1(S) ≤ exp()JcKm2(Γ(S)).
For clarity, we stress that all sets are over distinct elements (as we
have assumed throughout this paper). Let P = (c; return e). By
typing rule (T-RETURN), the return type B must be either num or
bool, and its distance must be zero. By semantics, for any value
set V ⊆ B,JP Km1(V ) = JcKm1({m | JeKm ∈ V }) (1)
≤ exp()JcKm2({Γ(m) | JeKm ∈ V }) (2)
≤ exp()JcKm2({m | JeKm ∈ V }) (3)
= exp()JP Km2(V ) (4)
where inequality (2) is true due to Theorem 1 (the application
of which requires the injective assumption). For inequality (3),
consider any m′ ∈ {Γ(m) | JeKm ∈ V }. It must be true that
m′ = Γ(m) ∧ JeKm ∈ V for some m ∈ M. Due to Lemma 4,JeKm = JeKΓ(m) (the distance of e must be 0). That is, JeKm =
v ⇔ JeKΓ(m) = v for any v. Hence,
m′ = Γ(m) ∧ JeKm ∈ V for some m ∈M
is the same as
m′ = m′′ ∧ JeKm′′ ∈ V for some m ∈M, where m′′ = Γ(m)
Since m′′ ∈M, m′ ∈ {m | JeKm ∈ V }. Hence, the inequality (3)
holds. We note that (3) is not an equality in general since Γ might
not be a surjection.
Therefore, by definition of differential privacy, c is -private.
B. Formal Semantics for the Target Language
The denotational semantics interprets a command c in the target
language (Figure 7) as a function JcK : M → P(M). The
semantics of commands are formalized as follows.JskipKm = {m}Jx := eKm = {m{JeKm/x}}Jhavoc xKm = ∪r∈R {m{r/x}}Jc1; c2Km = ∪m′∈Jc1KmJc2Km′
Jif e then c1 else c2Km = {Jc1Km if JeKm = trueJc2Km if JeKm = falseJwhile e do cKm = w∗ m
where w∗ = fix(λf. λm.if JeKm = true
then (∪m′∈JcKm f m′) else {m})Jc; return eKm = ∪m′∈JcKm {JeKm′}
Accordingly, the Hoare logic rules for the target language is
mostly standard, summarized in Figure 14.
C. Uniform Distribution
Lemma 5 (UniformDist). The following typing rule is sound w.r.t.
Lemma 2:
Γ(η) = numη·d − 1 < d ≤ 0
Γ ` η := Uniform[0,1] ⇀ havoc[0,1]η;v = v − log(d + 1)
Proof. When @v. m = m1{v/η} or m(η) < −1 or m(η) > 1,Jη := Uniform[0,1]Km1(m) = 0 by the semantics. Hence, desired
inequality is trivial.
When m = m1{v/η} for some −1 ≤ v ≤ 1. Let µ =
Uniform[0,1], d = JdKm. Notice that by typing rule d ≤ 0. So
d ≤ 0. We have Jη := Uniform[0,1]Km1(m)
= µ(v)
=
∫ 1
0
1{x≤v}dx
=
∫ 1
0
1{(d+1)x≤(d+1)v}dx
=
∫ 1+d
0
1
1 + d
1{x≤(d+1)v}dx
≤ 1
1 + d
∫ 1
0
1{x≤(d+1)v}dx
= exp(− log(d + 1))µ(v + v · d)
Sincem1 Γm2, we havem1{v/η}Γm2{(v + v · d)/η}.Hence,Jη := Uniform[0,1]Km1(m) ≤
exp(− log(d + 1))Jη := Uniform[0,1]Km2(Γ(m))
By the transformation, Uniform[0,1] ⇀ havoc[0,1]η;v =
v − log(d + 1), where Γ(η) = η · d. Hence, max(c′1 mm0) =J− log(d + 1)Km1{v/η} = − log(d + 1). Therefore,Jη := Uniform[0,1]Km1(m) ≤
exp(max(c′1 mm0))Jη := Uniform[0,1]Km2(Γ(m))
{Φ}skip{Φ} (H-SKIP) {Φ{e/x}}x := e{Φ} (H-ASGN)
{∀x. Φ}havoc (x){Φ} (HAVOC)
{Ψ}c1{Φ′} {Φ′}c2{Φ}
{Ψ}c1; c2{Φ} (H-SEQ)
{Φ}return e{Φ} (H-RETURN)
{e ∧Ψ}c1{Φ} {¬e ∧Ψ}c2{Φ}
{Ψ}if e then c1 else c2{Φ} (H-IF)
Ψ⇒ I {I ∧ e}c{I} I⇒ Φ
{Ψ}while e do c{Φ} (H-WHILE)
Figure 14. Hoare logic rules for the target language.
